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Abstract Because to defect is the evolutionary stable strategy in the prisoner’s
dilemma game (PDG), understanding the mechanism generating and maintaining
cooperation in PDG, i.e. the paradox of cooperation, has intrinsic significance for
understanding social altruism behaviors. Spatial structure serves as the key to this
dilemma. Here, we build the model of spatial PDG under a metapopulation frame-
work: the sub-populations of cooperators and defectors obey the rules in spatial
PDG as well as the colonization–extinction process of metapopulations. Using the
mean-field approximation and the pair approximation, we obtain the differential
equations for the dynamics of occupancy and spatial correlation. Cellular automa-
ton is also built to simulate the spatiotemporal dynamics of the spatial PDG in
metapopulations. Join-count statistics are used to measure the spatial correlation
as well as the spatial association of the metapopulation. Simulation results show
that the distribution is self-organized and that it converges to a static boundary
due to the boycotting of cooperators to defectors. Metapopulations can survive
even when the colonization rate is lower than the extinction rate due to the com-
pensation of cooperation rewards for extinction debt. With a change of parame-
ters in the model, a metapopulation can consist of pure cooperators, pure defec-
tors, or cooperator–defector coexistence. The necessary condition of cooperation
evolution is the local colonization of a metapopulation. The spatial correlation be-
tween the cooperators tends to be weaker with the increase in the temptation to
defect and the habitat connectivity; yet the spatial correlation between defectors
becomes stronger. The relationship between spatial structure and the colonization
rate is complicated, especially for cooperators. The metapopulation may undergo a
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temporary period of prosperity just before the extinction, even while the coloniza-
tion rate is declining.
Keywords Cooperation · Game theory · Join-count statistics · Pair approximation
· Spatial correlation and association
1. Introduction
The evolution of altruistic behavior is a fundamental issue in evolutionary biol-
ogy. Darwin’s natural selection is based on individual selection; however, altruistic
behavior obviously means cost to its actor. In searching for the approach through
which altruistic behavior emerges and persists, scientists have generally presented
three theories: group selection (Williams, 1966; Wilson and Sober, 1994), kin selec-
tion (Hamilton, 1964), and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamil-
ton, 1981). The group selection indicates that natural selection acts on organism
groups, rather than on individuals. Kin selection suggests that most of the benefit
of altruism goes to relatives and therefore benefits the gene of altruism (Hamil-
ton, 1964). The theory of reciprocal altruism based on prisoner’s dilemma games
(PDG) is adopted by most evolutionary biologists to explain the evolution of al-
truistic behavior (Harms, 1999; Hoffmann, 2000; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004).
In the PDG, each of two players has to decide simultaneously and independently
to cooperate, C, or defect, D (Nowak and May, 1992). The payoff to a player de-
pends on its own decision-making and also the choice of the opponent. If both
players choose C, both get a payoff of magnitude R (the reward for mutual co-
operation); if one defects while the other cooperates, D gets the game’s biggest
payoff, T (the temptation to defect), while C gets S (the payoff of sucker); if both
defect, both get U (the punishment for mutual defect) (Dieckmann et al., 2000).









The prisoner’s dilemma is defined by the inequalities T > R > U > S > and 2R >
T + S. Since defect behavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and
Nash equilibrium in the PDG (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), the successful
invasion of the cooperators into defectors, is almost impossible; even the resistance
of cooperators to defector’s invasion becomes difficult. Organisms look forward to
the reward from the recipient even though the altruistic behavior incurs cost to the
organism itself, such as the reciprocal feeding in vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984).
This incurs the paradox of cooperation (how the altruistic behavior is maintained
in the natural world), especially for social species. The efforts to break this dead-
lock lead to the construction of complex strategies based on the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma games, such as the famous behavior strategy Tit-for-Tat (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1993).
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Although the importance of spatial interactions has been recognized for many
years, it is only recently (Levin et al., 1997), with the utilization of new tech-
niques and the availability of more powerful computers, that spatially explicit
dynamics have begun to be considered by ecologists. The progress in spatial
ecology (Tilman and Kareiva, 1997), especially of the knowledge in metapopu-
lation processes, i.e. a colonization–extinction dynamics (Hanski, 1998), enabled
scientists to answer many open problems in ecology. For example, the resolving of
Hutchinson’s (1961) paradox (species coexistence in homogeneous habitat vs.
competition exclusive principle) and Fisher’s (1930) paradox (polymorphism vs.
genetic load) heavily relies on the spatial and metapopulation structure of species
(Hanski and Zhang, 1993; Tilman, 1994; Hui and Yue, 2005). The metapopulation
framework has become an essential instrument for modeling the ecological and
evolutionary dynamics of a spatially structured habitat (e.g. Hanski, 1998; Hui and
Li, 2003; Hanski and Gaggiotti, 2004).
Spatial models have also been introduced into the PDG to resolve the para-
dox of cooperation. The paradigm of spatial PDG is as follows (Nowak and May,
1992): the game occurs between local neighbors, where a high fitness individual
excels. When mortality occurs, a neighbor will be randomly chosen to replace the
empty patch immediately. It focuses on the dynamics of the relative frequency of
each behavioral strategy within a constant population (Nowak et al., 1994; Nowak
and Sigmund, 2004). Yet, two issues can not be addressed: (1) the effect of PDG on
the total population dynamics as there are no empty patches in the traditional spa-
tial PDG; (2) the effect of colonization–extinction dynamics as well as PDG on the
spatial structure of the total species for the same reason. Note, here we only discuss
the intraspecific altruism, which means that the cooperator and the defector are
only the individual/sub-population of one species. In this work, we will try to build
up the spatial PDG in a metapopulation framework. Although some works have
already studied the PDG in a metapopulation framework (Harms, 1999), the focus,
simulation scale, as well as model type of this work are quite different. Using math-
ematical analysis and computer simulation, we will present (1) the primary factors
contributing to the evolution of cooperation, (2) the spatiotemporal dynamics of
the metapopulation consisting of defector and cooperator sub-populations using
the mean-field approximation as well as the pair approximation (Matsuda et al.,
1992; Harada and Iwasa, 1994; Hui and Li, 2004), (3) the spatial structure of the
defector, the cooperator and the metapopulation using join-count statistics (JCS)
(Upton and Fingleton, 1985; Fortin et al., 2002; Hui et al., 2006).
2. Model
Metapopulation describes a ‘population’ consisting of many local populations
(Levins, 1969). All the local populations have a substantial probability of extinc-
tion, and hence the long-term persistence of the species can only occur at the
regional or metapopulation level (Hanski, 1998). The classical metapopulation
framework is based on Levins’ (1969) patch occupancy model,
dP
dt
= cP(1 − P) − eP, (1)
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where P is the fraction of patches occupied by the species (i.e. the occupancy),
and c and e are the colonization and extinction rate, respectively. The non-trivial
equilibrium P̂ = 1 − e/c is globally stable as long as e < c (Tilman and Kareiva,
1997; Hanski, 1999). The Levins model assumes infinite habitat patches but also
that colonization is not affected by distance (Hanski, 1999). This assumption
means that all patches are equally connected to other patches, which is called the
mean-field assumption (Hanski, 1999; Hui and Li, 2003, 2004) and is often a good
approximation for metapopulation at a stochastic steady-state even if migration is
distance-dependent (Nisbet and Gurney, 1982; Durrett and Levin, 1994).
2.1. Mean-field approximation
Now, we introduce PDG into the metapopulation framework. Without losing
generality, let T = b, R = 1, U = −1 and S = −b (b > 1), which will not affect
the essential characteristics of the PDG (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Let PC and
PD(PC + PD = P) be the occupancy fractions of the cooperators and the defec-
tors. The mean payoffs of C and D are wC = PC − bPD and wD = bPC − PD, re-
spectively. Note that −b ≤ wC ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ wD ≤ b. These payoffs will greatly in-
fluence the colonization and local extinction of the metapopulation. As with other
classic models of PDG (e.g. Nowak and May, 1992; Dieckmann et al., 2000; Zhang
et al., 2005), we assume that the colonization rate of a sub-population is positively
correlated with its payoff, while the extinction rate is negatively correlated. Here,
we choose the simplest linear relationships as follows:




where  is behavior C or D; α and β are two coefficients of colonization and ex-
tinction, which are positive-linearly correlated with the colonization and extinction




= c P(1 − P) − e P. (3)
As we only address a one-round PDG here, the individuals or the sub-populations
of the metapopulation will not change their behavior strategy during their lifetime
(e.g. Harms, 1999). Although it is also called a spatial colonization model or a spa-
tially explicit population model, we will use the loose definition of metapopulation
and still call this spatial population a metapopulation (Chapter 1 in Tilman and
Kareiva, 1997). After calculation, the equilibrium of this model is

















It means that cooperators cannot stably coexist with defectors in a well-mixed pop-
ulation (Nowak and May, 1992; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994) and also implies that
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the Levins model with the mean-field assumption is not appropriate for describ-
ing the spatial patterns and the PDG. There is no chance for the evolution of co-
operation in metapopulations under the mean-field assumption (i.e. well-mixed
individuals).
2.2. Pair approximation
The most powerful approach to modeling spatially structured population dynam-
ics and local processes in ecology, is the lattice model with cellular automaton (e.g.
Hui, 2004), which has been widely adopted in the research of metapopulation dy-
namics and more general questions of spatial ecology (Tilman and Kareiva, 1997;
Hanski and Gaggiotti, 2004), as well as of the spatial PDG (e.g. Nowak and May,
1992; Harms, 1999). A potential problem with these spatially explicit models is that
analysis is often restricted to direct computer simulation. In fact, these spatially ex-
plicit simulation models can be analyzed by a useful approach, called pair approxi-
mation, which was introduced to ecological research by Matsuda et al. (1992). This
approximation, first used in statistical physics (Katori and Konno, 1991; Tainaka,
1993), has been carried out for many models of population dynamics of plants and
metapopulations (Iwasa et al., 1991; Harada and Iwasa, 1994; Harada et al., 1994;
Hui and Li, 2004). Pair approximation, as one of the primary approaches of the
moment approximations, is conceptually and mathematically similar to the JCS
(Hui et al., 2006).
Here, we will introduce the pair approximation into the study of spatial games.
According to the processes of PDG in metapopulations, the dynamics of defectors
and cooperators can be described by the pair approximation as follows:
dPC
dt
= α b + QC/E − bQD/E
2b
PCE − β bPC − PCC + bPDC2b (5a)
dPD
dt
= α b + bQC/E − QD/E
2b








































































where P is the probability that a randomly chosen patch is occupied by a -
strategy local population (note that E indicates the state of empty patches), P
is the probability that a randomly chosen pair of nearest-neighbor patches is in
state ′, Q/′ is the conditional probability that a randomly chosen neighbor
of a patch in state ′ is in state , Q/′′′ is the conditional probability that a
randomly chosen neighbor of the ′ patch in a ′′′ pair patches is in state ,
symbol ∇′′′ represents (1 + (z − 1)Q/′′′ )/z, and z is the number of neighbor
patches and means the dispersal region of migrants. Equation (5) is analogues to
Eq. (3). For a given empty patch, every local population in the habitat can con-
tribute to the colonization of this patch by the mean-field approximation (the
term C in Eq. (3)), while only local populations in the neighboring patches
can colonize the patch by pair approximation (the first right-term in Eq. (5a–d)
and the first two right-terms in Eq. (5e)). Noted that Q/′′′ = Q/′ in pair ap-
proximation and all the probabilities can be calculated by the five variables (PC ,
PD, PCC , PDD and PCD) in Eq. (5) according to the probability theory (Q/′ =
P′/P′ ).
2.3. Spatial analysis
Two approaches will be adopted for discussing the dynamics and spatial patterns
of spatial games in metapopulations. First, we analyze the dynamics and equilibri-
ums of Eq. (5) through the numerical solution (Hilborn, 2000; Hui and Li, 2004)
using NDSlove function in Mathemtica (version 5.0.1, Wolfram Inc.). The value of
P and Q/′ at T = 1000 were assumed to be the equilibriums of the Eq. (5),
from which we can obtain all the variables (see below). The second approach is a
simulation, with which we can obtain the spatial patterns of PDG (as in Hui and
Li, 2003; Hui et al., 2004). We construct a lattice model for a finite number of n × n
patches on a two-dimensional homogeneous patchy habitat with synchronous up-
dating and a von Neumann (four nearest patches) or Moore (eight nearest patches)
neighborhood. We used periodic boundaries, which are often used in theoretical
literature (Schonfisch, 1997; Kermer et al., 1998; Hui et al., 2004; Sayama, 2004),
instead of absorbing boundaries (Huxel and Hastings, 1999). We ignore the time
required for movement, which is also the classical assumption in many spatially im-
plicit and explicit models (McGlade, 1999; Dieckmann et al., 2000; Hui and Yue,
2005).
To describe the spatial structure of the distribution pattern, we adopt a spatio-
stat index, the JCS (Fortin et al., 2002). The JCS is conceptually and mathemati-
cally similar to the pair-approximation (or moment approximation) approach used
to describe spatial distributions in metapopulation ecology (see Dieckmann et al.,
2000, for outline of the latter). JCS can be used to classify distributions as spa-
tially aggregated, segregated or random in terms of the global and local densities
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used in pair approximation (Sato and Iwasa, 2000; Hui and Li, 2004). Here, we use
I = Q/ − P as the specific aggregation index in the model analysis. Spatially
explicit aggregation can be described by I > 0, indicating the positive first-order
spatial correlation between two adjacent, occupied grids. The spatially random
distribution has I = 0 and implies the independence of two adjacent, occupied
grids. Lastly, therefore, the spatially segregated distribution can be depicted by
I < 0, i.e. a negative spatial correlation between two adjacent samples (Hui and
Li, 2004; Hui et al., 2006). The JCS can also be adopted for determining whether
and to what extent different species are associated (Cole, 1957; Greig-Smith, 1964;
Pielou, 1972; Perry et al., 2002), and therefore for analyzing the association be-
tween different behavior strategies. We use A/′ = Q/′ − Q′/′ as the index
of spatial association. If A/′ > 0, it means that the behavior ′ is positively as-
sociated with the behavior , i.e. there are more  populations neighboring to ′
population than ′ itself. If A/′ < 0, there is a negative association; if A/′ = 0,
no association is found. Indices I and A/′ will be adopted to describe the spatial
structure of cooperator and defector, as well as the metapopulation, in the spatial
PDG.
3. Results
From this simulation, we obtain the following results. (1) The cooperators assem-
ble together and are encircled by the defectors (Fig. 1a, von Neumann neigh-
borhood; Fig. 1b, Moore neighborhood). (2) The metapopulation density is ob-
viously higher in the cooperative region than in the defective region (Fig. 1, t-
test QC/C > QD/D; t-value = 100.15, df = 998, p < 0.001, z = 4; t-value = 9.98,
df = 879, p < 0.001, z = 8). (3) The distribution is self-organized since a static
border between cooperators and defectors is formed after 75 time steps of the
coalescing phase. There are almost no empty patches along the borders in the co-
operation side and hence there is no space to let the defectors invade. (4) The
effect of the neighboring structure is strong. As the patch connectivity increases
(from von Neumann to Moore neighborhood), the clumpy structure breaks down
rapidly (Fig. 1). The global density of cooperators with the Moore neighborhood is
significantly lower than that with the von Neumann neighborhood (t-value = 66.3,
df = 998, p < 0.001). The distribution of cooperators becomes more fragmented
in highly connected patchy networks. In addition, in the simulation, the boundary
condition (periodic, absorbing, or reflection) does not affect the simulation dynam-
ics, especially when the grid number is high (e.g. no significant difference is found
when the grids are more than 50 × 50).
The simulation also shows the dynamics of the fraction of patches occupied by
the cooperators, defectors, as well as the metapopulation (i.e. the cooperators and
defectors in total) (Fig. 2a). For the same parameters, the fraction of occupied
patches by the metapopulation with a von Neumann neighborhood has higher oc-
cupied patches than the one with a Moore neighborhood. The cooperators be-
come dominant in the von Neumann patch network but they become extinct in the
Moore patch network (Fig. 2a). The spatial correlation shows a more complicated
pattern (Fig. 2b). There is a transitive phase for the aggregation intensities of the
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Fig. 1 Spatial dynamics of spatial PDG (a) with von Neumann neighborhood and (b) with Moore
neighborhood. Black patches are cooperators, gray patches are defectors, and white patches are
empty (in a 200 × 200 patches networks at time t = 25, 75 and 125). Parameter values: (a) α = 0.7,
β = 0.2, b = 1.6, z = 4; (b) α = 0.6, β = 0.2, b = 1.6, z = 8.
cooperator IC , the defector ID, as well as of the metapopulation I+ (I+ = QC/D +
QD/C + IC + ID; ± indicates the occupied state). The variance of the dynamics of
the spatial correlation with the von Neumann neighborhood is much smaller than
that with the Moore neighborhood; yet the latter reach equilibrium more easily
(Fig. 2b). The spatial correlation with the Moore neighborhood of the metapopula-
tion I+ limits to a value around 0.01; yet, the one with the von Neumann neighbor-
hood limits to −0.01 (more regularly distributed). The spatial correlation of defec-
tors is much more stable (less variance) than that of the cooperators (Fig. 2b). The
spatial association also shows an interesting result (Fig. 2c). First, the association
AD/C is below zero (negative association); while the association AC/D is larger than
zero (positive association). Second, the dynamics of the association AD/C (stan-
dard deviation for 200 < t < 400, std= 0.0244 for z = 4; std= 0.0075 for z = 8) is
much more stable than those of AC/D (std= 0.0474 for z = 4; std = 0.277 for z = 8).
Moreover, the association AD/C with the Moore neighborhood is significantly
higher than that with the von Neumann neighborhood (Fig. 2c; t-value = 54.87,
df = 998, p < 0.001).
Using pair approximation, we can study the spatial distribution and dynamics
of metapopulations quantitatively. The dynamics and spatial patterns of coopera-
tors and defectors in metapopulations can be profoundly influenced by the ratio
of colonization to extinction coefficients α/β, the temptation to defect b and the
neighboring structure z. When we overlap the global densities of cooperators and
defectors on one graph, we can see the influence of the neighboring structures on
coexistence in Fig. 3. First, the temptation–colonization plane can be divided into




















































Fig. 2 Temporal dynamics of (a) occupancy (global density), (b) spatial correlation, and (c) spa-
tial association in a spatial PDG (80 × 80 patches) with von Neumann and Moore neighborhood.
Parameter values: α = 0.7, β = 0.2, b = 1.6.



























four parts: extinction (black region), pure cooperator (white region), coexistence
of cooperator and defector (light gray) and pure defector (dark gray). With the
increase of neighboring number (from low value of z to the mean-field assump-
tion, i.e. from a local-interacted population to a spatially well-mixed population),
the region of pure cooperator will diminish and the region of pure defector will
expand (Fig. 3). It implies that the mean-field approximation might underestimate
the cooperator density and that the high connectivity of habitat patches will ben-
efit defectors. Cooperators can even survive with the low colonization coefficient
α < β in a highly local interaction (z = 2 in Fig. 3) because cooperators can com-
pensate for the extinction debt and survive by the rewards of cooperation. This
compensation breaks down with the connectivity of patches (such as z = 16 in
Fig. 3) because the defector has a high probability of meeting a cooperator during
its lifetime and seizes the rewards. Therefore, the average payoff per local popula-
tion in a metapopulation will decrease in highly connected habitat. It is a balance
between the mean payoff of the local population, determined by PDG, and the vi-
ability of the metapopulation, determined by the colonization–extinction process.
Patch connectivity has the opposite effect on the payoff of the local population and
the metapopulation viability.
By pair approximation (Eq. 5), we can also calculate the global density P that
indicates the fraction of -state patches (i.e. the occupancy) (Fig. 4) and the spatial
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Fig. 3 The influence of the number of neighboring patches (z) on spatial PDG. Regions of ex-
tinction (black), pure cooperator (white), coexistence of cooperator and defector (light gray) and
pure defector (dark gray) in the temptation–colonization phase plane are plotted under different
neighborhood z. z = 2 (a), 4(b), 8(c), and 16(d), respectively. Parameter values: β = 0.2.
correlation I that indicates the contagiousness of the spatial distribution of -
strategy local populations (Fig. 5), and the spatial association A/′ that indicates
the attraction of ′-strategy populations to -strategy ones (Fig. 6). Since the solu-
tions to Eq. (5) are too complicated, we show these densities or probabilities under
a fixed extinction coefficient (β = 0.2) in Figs. 4, 5, and 6. As for cooperators, the
global density PC decreases with the number of neighboring patches z (if z ≥ 4;
Fig. 4a) and with the temptation to defect b (Fig. 4b). The global density of de-
fectors PD increases with the colonization coefficient α (Fig. 4c, d) as well as with
temptation to defect b (Fig. 4d). However, the effect of patch neighborhood z on
PD is not significant (Fig. 4c) (t-test of PD for z = 2 and z = 30; t-value = 0.624,
df = 98, p = 0.534). As for the metapopulation size P+ (P+ = PC + PD), the ef-
fect of z is not significant for high colonization rate (t-test of P+ for 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1;
t-value = 0.224, df = 48, p = 0.823), but is significant when z (2 ≤ z ≤ 4) and α
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Fig. 4 Influence of the number of neighboring patches (z), the temptation to defect (b) and the
colonization coefficient (α) on the occupancy of the cooperators PC (a, b), the defectors PD (c, d)
and the metapopulations P+ (e, f). Parameter values: β = 0.2; (a, c, e) b = 1.4; (b, d, f) z = 4.
(around β) are both small (Fig. 4e) (t-test of P+ for 0.24 ≤ α ≤ 0.4; t-value = 3.57,
df = 14, p < 0.01). When the temptation to defect is small (b < 1.5), an interesting
phenomenon occurs (Fig. 4f): although the decrease of the colonization coefficient
α is obviously harmful to the cooperators and defectors as well as the metapop-
ulation (because their persistence relies on the colonization–extinction process),
the metapopulation size P+ is amazingly increasing with the decrease of the
colonization coefficient α (Fig. 4f). This counter-intuitive phenomenon only hap-
pens before the defectors are extinct.
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Fig. 5 Influence of the number of neighboring patches (z), the temptation to defect (b) and the
colonization coefficient (α) on the spatial correlation of the cooperators IC (a, b), the defectors ID
(c, d) and the metapopulations I+ (e, f). Parameter values: β = 0.2; (a, c, e) b = 1.4; (b, d, f) z = 4.
The spatial correlation of the cooperators IC declines rapidly with the increase
of patch neighbors z (Fig. 5a), but IC does not show a clear pattern with the in-
crease of the colonization coefficient α or the temptation to defect b (Fig. 5a, b).
There is a threshold for the colonization coefficient α (equals 0.35 in Fig. 5). Above
the threshold, the spatial correlation of the cooperators will increase at first and
than decrease with the temptation to defect (Fig. 5b). If the colonization rate is
large enough, spatial correlation IC will directly decrease with the temptation b
(Fig. 5b). The spatial correlation of the defectors ID declines with the number of
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Fig. 6 Influence of the number of neighboring patches (z), the temptation to defect (b) and the
colonization coefficient (α) on the spatial association between the cooperators and the defectors
(a, b: AD/C ; c, d: AC/D). Parameter values: β = 0.2; (a, c) b = 1.4; (b, d) z = 4.
patch neighbors z (Fig. 5c), yet increases with the temptation to defect b (Fig. 5d).
Similarly, above the threshold α ≈ 0.35, with the increase of colonization coeffi-
cient α, the spatial correlation of defectors ID will decrease. This is because the
defectors try to avoid each other, leading to a more regular distribution in spatial
habitat. As for the metapopulation, the spatial correlation I+ = Q+/+ − P+ de-
clines with the increase of z (Fig. 5e) and with the increase of b (Fig. 5f). Above
the threshold of α, the spatial correlation of the metapopulation declines with α
(but increases with α if α < 0.35) (Fig. 5e, f).
The spatial association A/′ (A/′ = Q/′ − Q′/′ ) also shows a compli-
cated pattern with the change of patch neighbors z, the colonization coefficient
α and the temptation to defect b (Fig. 6). With the increase of z (Fig. 6a) and b
(Fig. 6b), the association AD/C increases from a negative value to a positive one,
which indicates that more defectors will be found around the cooperators if we
improve the connectivity of the patches or the temptation to defect. Above the
threshold of α, association AD/C will also increase with the colonization coefficient
α. The spatial association AC/D shows a general decline with the colonization co-
efficient α (Fig. 6c, d) and the temptation to defect b (Fig. 6d). The effect of patch
neighbors z on the association AC/D is weak (Fig. 6c) (t-test AC/D for z = 2 and
z = 30; t-value = 1.29, df = 98, p = 0.2). It implies that fewer cooperators can
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be found if we raise the temptation to defect b and the colonization coefficient α
(Fig. 6c, d).
4. Discussion
We have built a spatial PDG in metapopulations. The colonization–extinction pro-
cess was influenced by the payoffs in the spatial PDG. The influence of the colo-
nization rate, the number of neighboring patches and the temptation to defect on
the occupancy, spatial correlation and association were revealed. Cellular automa-
ton shows a self-organized structure of the cooperators in the 2D spatial habitat
(Fig. 1). The defectors cheat the cooperators only along the boundaries. However,
the high payoffs of the cooperators guarantee the high success of colonization
along the boundaries, which boycott the invasion of defectors. This boycott of co-
operators to defectors in the spatial habitat might be an essential approach for
survival.
The spatial version of PDG has two extensions. First, Huberman and Glance
(1993) have introduced a continuous-time simulation to the model. They consid-
ered that the sites on the lattice are updated asynchronously, by randomly choos-
ing a site and updating in each round. However, it is more plausible that the payoff
of individuals only determines the probability that this individual will win in the
next generation, instead of there being a deterministic updating rule (Nowak et al.,
1994). The other extension is to incorporate spatial irregularities into the model.
The individuals or sites are distributed randomly on a plane and only interact with
neighbors who lie within some defined radius (Nowak et al., 1994). All of these
extensions, either on time, the updating rule, or on space, do not change the ba-
sic result of coexistence of cooperators and defectors, although the details differs
(Dieckmann et al., 2000). Our results also reinforce this finding. Contrasting the
mean-field approximation Eq. (3) with the pair approximation Eq. (5), we can
indicate that the necessary condition of the cooperation evolution is the local col-
onization of metapopulation.
The decline of the number of patch neighbors z and the colonization coeffi-
cient α all contribute to the increase of the occupied patches by the coopera-
tors, and therefore, favor the evolution of cooperation. Hui and Li (2003) di-
vided habitat destruction into three types: habitat loss, patch isolation (that lead
to dispersal cost and decrease in the colonization coefficient α) and habitat de-
cay (the decrease of the patch quality that increases the local extinction coeffi-
cient β). Zhang et al. (2005) have shown that patch isolation and habitat decay
might help the cooperators finally win the spatial PDG. Because the decline in the
number of patch neighbors z and the colonization coefficient α indicates (1) the
decline of patch connectivity and (2) the decline of dispersal ability, the results
here also consistent with Zhang et al. (2005). Further studies show that other types
of habitat destruction also improve the cooperative behavior in metapopulations
(Zhang and Hui, in preparation). The environmental challenge to the metapopu-
lation in fact gives a chance for the evolution of cooperation in the metapopula-
tions. Altruistic behavior is in fact a strategic response of species to environmental
stress.
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If there is only one behavior (either cooperators or defectors) in a metapopula-
tion, the decline in the colonization rate is definitely harmful (i.e. the metapopu-
lation size declines with habitat destruction; note the decline in colonization rate
can be caused by habitat destruction, Hui and Li, 2003). However, the metapop-
ulation with two behavior strategies can even increase its size with the declin-
ing colonization rate (Fig. 4f). This amazing result is, to some extent, analo-
gous to Parrondo’s paradox in game theory (Harmer and Abbott, 1999), which
shows the possibility of winning by two losing gambling games. The reason here
for the increase in metapopulation size is that the increase in the mean pay-
off of the cooperators wC overtakes the one of the defectors wD, which in turn
increases the colonization rate of the metapopulation, i.e. the compensation of
cooperation rewards for extinction debt. It means that population size is not a
consistent indicator of the environmental changes, especially for social species
(McGeoch and Chown, 1998).
The temporary prosperity of the metapopulation in this work shows that it is
not sufficient to monitor the environmental changes or habitat destruction by
metapopulation size alone; the spatial structure is also needed. Wilson et al. (2004)
indicated that declining species are expected to have sparse distribution because
local extinctions cause retractions in range to optimal habitats (Brown et al., 1995;
Johnson, 1998; Rodriguez and Delibes, 2002) or to locations that have been least
affected by wide-acting extinction forces (Channell and Lomolino, 2000). Increas-
ing species are expected to have more aggregated distributions, resulting from dis-
tance delimited colonization processes (Shigesada and Kawasaki, 1997). Results
here show that those demonstrations were consistent with the spatial structure of
defectors (Fig. 4c, d; Fig. 5c, d). However, the spatial structure of cooperators is
not always consistent with those empirical conclusions (Fig. 4a, b; Fig. 5a, b). As a
result, the spatial structure of metapopulations supports those conclusions in most
ranges of the parameters, except in the region of temporary prosperity (Fig. 5f).
The results here call for caution in predicting population trends by spatial struc-
ture, especially for species with multiple life history strategies (such as different
morphologies or behaviors, etc.).
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